Understanding Why National Security Decisions Happen

One response is to reject the very premise of the questions posed – to argue that there is no value in engaging in any sort of autopsy of US foreign policy and national security decision-making. A related answer, famously posited by President John F. Kennedy, is to assert the fundamental unknowability of how and why decisions are made, because such matters are “impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself.”⁵⁵ John F. Kennedy, “Foreword to Theodore C. Sorensen’s ‘Decision-Making in the White House,’” The American Presidency Project 370 (September 23, 1963), at: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9421. Thus, some have argued that events in Libya occurred “seemingly by happenstance.”⁶⁶ See Micah Zenko’s discussion of this attitude and his criticisms of it in “The Big Lie about the Libyan War,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2016, at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention. This, however, is neither a useful nor an accurate approach, and certainly not one of any value to current and future practitioners who will be charged in the course of their careers with analyzing and shaping American foreign and national security policy. American naval vessels did not simply appear in the Mediterranean, and cruise missiles and aircraft were not launched of their own accord at undefined locations. United Nations resolutions and allied coalitions did not materialize out of thin air. At some point, decisions were made that activated certain courses of action and closed off other alternatives – whether to eschew a diplomatic approach in favor of military action, to extend or deny recognition to governments, even to strike or not strike particular targets. At its core, foreign and national security policy involves a constant stream of deliberate decisions to take or refrain from taking actions (see Box 1.1 National Security versus Foreign Policy for a discussion of the overlap of these two terms).

Moreover, such a fatalistic attitude that foreign policy “just happens” fails to provide the student (and the future analyst or practitioner) with a way to understand how decisions were made and what factors influenced the process. This shrugging of the shoulders approach offers no opportunity to learn from past mistakes, suggest changes for the future, or validate existing procedures. Thus, there is a need to open the proverbial “black box” of decision-making (that is, the internal workings of a government or administration) and attempt to identify and understand the various factors and drivers that determine what particular policy options are placed on or taken off the table, why they are adopted or rejected, and how they are executed.⁷⁷ Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy is What States Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations Theory,” in Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubálková (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 27.

Some analysts will immediately approach the question by focusing on individual leaders, arguing that the characters, background, worldviews, and management styles of the key decision-makers explain the sequence of events surrounding the Libya intervention (see Box 1.2 President Obama’s Libya Intervention for photos of some participants).⁸⁸ For instance, in his analysis of decision-making, Arnold Wolfers stressed the importance of individual agency and choice in the selection of policies. See his Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 41. Gadhafi’s erratic leadership style and irresponsible and inflammatory rhetoric alienated potential defenders and alarmed both Arab and Western leaders. For Obama’s part, the precepts outlined in his 2009 Cairo address and in his remarks accepting the Nobel Peace Prize made it clear that he would be looking for an opportunity to use American power judiciously to defend human rights and to support the emerging “Arab Spring.” Different leaders in Washington and Tripoli might very well have meant that the Libya crisis would have evolved in a far different fashion – depending on how these individual leaders framed desired end-states, evaluated risks and rewards, and how they processed information and advice.⁹⁹ A number of key economic theories about how individuals make choices have been applied to national security decision-making, among them “rational choice” theory and “prospect” theory. For an analysis of how these theories can apply to foreign policy analysis, see Steven B. Redd and Alex Mintz, “Policy Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Policy Studies Journal 41(S1) (2013): S11–S37.

Not so fast, others will interject. Leaders, they argue, are responding to trends in the international environment that provide incentives to act or to refrain from acting.¹⁰¹⁰ For a discussion of the context of systemic incentives as they relate to US policy in the Middle East, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 18–20. For all his stirring rhetoric, President Obama had shown himself, over the preceding two years, to be very cautious in considering when and where to intervene. These observers would point to how developments in the international environment pushed the White House to get involved: a request from the Arab League, the first in its history, asking for American military involvement to avert a humanitarian tragedy; pressure from America’s European allies in NATO, who, having supported the president’s military surge in Afghanistan, were looking for a reciprocal American commitment to assisting in a security mission on Europe’s vulnerable southern periphery; and a rare alignment of the diplomatic stars at the United Nations clearing the way for a UN Security Council resolution to authorize action without the prospect of a Russian or Chinese veto.

Still others will focus attention on how the internal governmental processes within the national security system of the US Executive Branch, or the broader dynamics of American domestic politics, might have affected and shaped decisions. Did the president have a process in place that allowed for careful consideration of all options in the search for the optimal choice in pursuit of US interests? To what extent did personalities and factions swirling around Obama control how different policy choices were formulated and presented for his consideration? Were the options under consideration based on pure strategic assessments of the situation or on preferences and views of different national security organizations? These questions focus on how the balance of influence and information can shape the decision environment – a leader may not impose a decision as much as he or she accepts compromise choices that result from bargaining among different parts of the Executive Branch, between the president and Congress, and between the United States and other countries. In such cases, a decision may be less about what a president or other leaders want, and more about what options are possible given political and systemic constraints.¹¹¹¹ For a narrative that helps to summarize the different influences, see, for instance, Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist,” New Yorker, May 2, 2011, at: www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist. For a more academic assessment, see Mikael Blomdahl, “Bureaucratic Roles and Positions: Explaining the United States’ Libya Decision,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 27(1) (2016): 142–161.

In understanding the choices a country makes in terms of its national security options, therefore, the analyst must consider a wide range of factors and influences: the position and freedom of maneuver the state enjoys in the international system and the tools of statecraft it has at its disposal; how its government and bureaucracy are set up; if and how the government represents the broader society and how this society envisions its collective interests; and the personalities and worldviews of national leaders and those they select as advisors and department heads.¹²¹² Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Ryan K. Beasley, “The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective,” in Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective, eds. Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr, 2nd edn (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2013), 7–19.

The risk here, of course, is of falling into the trap that everything explains everything. Some factors – whether personal, political, organizational, or systemic – will have had more influence than others in any specific instance. But determining which analytic paradigm should take precedence or has more explanatory accuracy can be difficult. Did the United States, for instance, eschew the deployment of ground forces to Libya because President Obama, having cast himself as “not George W. Bush” in the 2008 election campaign, was reluctant to emulate his predecessor by getting involved in a complicated land operation in yet another Middle Eastern country? Did the decision reflect a series of legal and political compromises that allowed for US participation in the Libya operation without triggering the War Powers Act 1973 – requiring a declaration of war or some other form of congressional authorization – or significant institutional and public resistance?¹³¹³ See, for instance, Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, “The Decline of Western Realism,” National Interest 117 (Jan./Feb. 2012), 8–20, for a discussion of some of these issues. Sometimes, different influences can align to move policy choices in the same direction; in other cases, policy may emerge from the struggle between competing and contradictory factors.

Consider the analogy of national security policy as a train on a specific policy railroad track: if there are no interruptions or changes, policy will move in a particular direction toward a particular end, unless, by deliberate choice or the impact of circumstance, something causes the policy train to switch tracks, jump tracks, or reverse. The academic study of foreign policy analysis (FPA) gives us the conceptual tools to focus our analytical attention to ascertain which factors, variables, or circumstances keep policy on track or cause it to reverse or change tracks (or even to derail).¹⁴¹⁴ On the role of the theoretical tools in understanding decisions, see Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), esp. 7–8.

Why Study Foreign Policy Analysis?

In understanding past decisions, or in assessing the unfolding environment as decisions are being made, it becomes necessary to identify the balance of factors – the personalities of the leaders, the makeup of the international environment, the demands of domestic politics, the structural and institutional framework in which national security decisions are taken – that will determine the shape and scope of the options that are placed on the table for consideration. In any foreign or national security policy situation, there will be a wide variety of institutional, domestic, and global factors at play (see Box 1.3 Models of Foreign and National Security Policymaking). These determinants of action are various “unrelated internal and external factors [that] become related in the actions of the decision-makers.”¹⁵¹⁵ R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1962), 53, 85. This is the realm of the academic field of FPA, which provides the theoretical underpinnings for this textbook.

But not all factors will matter equally at any given time. Part of the process of analysis, therefore, is to be able to determine which are the “influentials,” that is, those that are most in play and/or that will have the most impact on a given decision or set of related decisions.¹⁶¹⁶ The notion of “influentials” first referred to key persons in the decision process (see, for instance, Mark Lagon, “Are ‘Influentials’ Less Influential?” World Affairs 158 (1996): 122–135), but can be expanded to consider various other factors such as organizations and institutions. See, for example, Richard J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 200. Has Congress staked out a position, for instance? Are they likely to get involved, or will they hand a blank check to the Executive Branch? Are there interest groups with a position and preferred policy outcome? Media influence? Is the president personally invested in a particular outcome and seeking to shape the situation, or is he responding to a situation where others are the driving force? Are there significant divisions among his team? Do his advisors and personal staff have differences of opinion with the heads of the key bureaucratic agencies? Do different parts of government have stakes in particular outcomes? How about the international environment? Are allies offering help, or are adversaries in a position to raise costs for US action to an unacceptable level? Every case is different in terms of what appears to move policy. As a result, any number of “variables might be added (or subtracted)” when considering different situations.¹⁷¹⁷ Stephen J. Andriole, Jonathan Wilkenfield, and Gerald W. Hopple, “A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior,” International Studies Quarterly 19(2) (June 1975): 194.

The purpose of this book is to equip you with the intellectual tools and frameworks to probe national security decision-making and to be able to assess the interplay of different (and sometimes competing) factors and influences. Many good and useful volumes have already been written to guide the future academic who is planning to study these matters and pursue an advanced research agenda related to US foreign policy. However, we have a different purpose in mind. We want to make these tools accessible to the aspiring analyst or practitioner – a student who intends to pursue a career related to some aspect of conceptualizing, assessing, or implementing US foreign and national security policy. We aim to provide theoretical constructs that can help to make sense of the complex environment in which policy is decided and to offer conceptual landmarks that can assist in the successful navigation of that environment.¹⁸¹⁸ That policymakers and their staff need such resources was a point raised by Lisa S. Disbrow of the Joint Staff in a 2002 paper at the National War College, “Decision Superiority: Transforming National Security Decision-Making.” This was also discussed in Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis?” Joint Forces Quarterly 76(1) (2015): 30–34.

General Colin Powell, at the time serving as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS), advised mid-career military officers of the importance of understanding the “broader context in which you are serving,” and that an inability to chart the various influences and pressures that shape national security decisions would lead to failure.¹⁹¹⁹ Colin S. Powell, “The Triangle Analogy,” excerpt of an address given at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 6, 1990. You may not ever be directly involved yourself in making high-level national security decisions, but it is essential for any national security analyst or practitioner to understand this broader context. Scholars often examine foreign policy decisions in order to assess the utility of various theories, whereas political pundits seek to render judgments about their wisdom or folly. In contrast, the objective policy analyst seeks to obtain useful roadmaps of the broader decision environment. This is especially important for the current or prospective practitioner, since this is the very environment in which she or he will be functioning. Thus, the emphasis in this book is on taking various theories and rendering them in a fashion that is useful for someone who will be assessing and/or working within the foreign and national security policy decision-making environment.

Textbook Organization

Chapter 2 introduces the academic field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). This scene-setting chapter explains this book’s conceptual fusion of three foundational approaches – the levels of analysis posited by scholar Kenneth Waltz and then refined by David Singer (the individual, the nation-state, and the international system); the various paradigms (or models) of decision-making first developed by scholar Graham Allison and then refined and expanded by others to explain the workings of the US national security apparatus; and, the concept of the two-level game as explicated by scholar Robert Putnam, where decisions emerge from concurrent negotiations between countries and within each of their own domestic political systems. From these foundations, six analytic perspectives are developed. Each of these distinctive perspectives is then examined in separate chapters as integral lenses that, when used together, offer a complete conceptual toolkit for the analysis of American foreign and national security decisions.

Chapter 3 introduces what we term the unitary state perspective. Known to generations of scholars under the formal academic rubric, rational actor model, the unitary state perspective starts from the premise that states function as unitary actors and are able to articulate and act upon a clear definition of “the national interest.” It posits that states are responding primarily to developments at the international level, and have a coherent and consistent process for assigning priorities. At its core this lens sees the conglomerated state acting for itself within the systemic international environment.

Chapter 4 offers the contrasting paradigm of what we term the cognitive perspective. This perspective shifts the analytic focus to the impact of beliefs, worldviews, and experiences of individuals in leadership positions, especially the American president. At its core this lens focuses on how human factors can shape an individual president’s perceptions and assessments in ways that may influence foreign policy outcomes.

Chapter 5 explores the organizational process perspective. This perspective reconceives the concept of policy goals through the lens of the procedures, missions, and cultures of specific organizations. It therefore shifts the center of gravity for policymaking away from the unitary state to the myriad of departments and agencies within that state. This shift is particularly pertinent in the American context given the size and dispersion of the national security apparatus throughout the Executive Branch. At its core this lens focuses attention on the middle level of analysis – the domestic/organizational – as the dominant factor, as opposed to the systemic/international level in which the unitary state perspective is situated, and the individual level of the cognitive perspective.

Chapter 6 examines the bureaucratic politics perspective. This perspective marries organizations with their leaders and representatives by stressing bureaucratic interests and the bargaining that takes place within the Executive Branch among different departments and agencies. At its core this lens focuses attention on give-and-take within the interagency process that can lead to policy outcomes that prioritize satisfactory compromises rather than optimal solutions

Chapter 7 introduces the palace politics perspective. This perspective expands the focus of attention beyond the formal bureaucracy and its leadership to take into account the circle of advisors around the president jostling for influence. At its core this lens highlights the growing ability of the chief executive to bypass formal processes to develop and execute policy through his staff rather than relying on agencies and departments.²⁰²⁰ For more on the perspectives, see Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Decisions, Perspectives and Ethics,” Ethics and International Affairs, July 12, 2016, at: www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2016/decision-perspectives-ethics.

Chapter 8 introduces the idea that there is a distinct variety of subordinate bureaucratic politics, which we term the sub-bureaucratic politics perspective. This perspective broadens and builds on insights of traditional conceptions of bureaucratic politics to explore the dynamics of bargaining and maneuvering at lower levels of the foreign and national security policymaking process. This lens sharpens the downward focus on the day-to-day workings of the US national security system beneath the level of the president and the principal leaders of departments and agencies. At its core this lens highlights the influence of those at the staff and civil servant level who act as “advocates” and “blockers” of sub-agency priorities. This chapter suggests that it is especially important for prospective practitioners to be aware of the dynamics of sub-bureaucratic politics, in spite of this being an area that has generally escaped significant notice in scholarly treatments of US national security decision-making.

Chapter 9 explores the influences of domestic politics. This takes us beyond decision-making within the Executive Branch to situate US national security decision-making within the broader confines of domestic politics in the unique context of the American system of government. It looks at the constraints on the Executive’s freedom of action that come from Congress, other political actors, and the larger civil society. At its core this chapter focuses attention on the extent to which US national security decisions arise from coalitions among administration officials, legislators, and interest groups that develop to support or to block particular foreign policy options.²¹²¹ Mackubin Owens, “What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil–Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, July 29, 2013, at: www.fpri.org/article/2013/07/what-military-officers-need-to-know-about-civil-military-relations.

Chapter 10 looks abroad to consider decision-making in other countries. The focus here is not on the international system level of analysis, but rather on whether and how FPA tools can assist the American analyst or practitioner to understand the foreign policy decision-making of other countries. This chapter examines both country-specific and comparative approaches to understanding how other countries make national security decisions, and whether these can account for differences in the foreign policy choices adopted by different governments. This chapter notes the shortcomings of the so-called comparative foreign policy (CFP) approach, leaving the American analyst no option but to try to discern inside the “black box” in each and every other country of interest. At its core this chapter reveals that the national security analyst or practitioner must not only be able to understand the influences on his or her own country’s decision-making process, but likewise be able to chart and analyze factors that may influence decisions in other countries, whether allies, partners, or adversaries.

Chapter 11 ties things together in a synthesizing conclusion. Beyond summarizing all the analytic tools that have been laid out in the previous chapters, this final chapter stresses the predisposition to certain policy options over others in the context of the contemporary national and international security environment.

The Case Study Annex provides a series of short decision-making case studies that can be used at any point throughout the book to practice applying the conceptual tools being discussed. These give the reader the chance to get a hands-on feel for how the analytic tools provided can be used to explain past decisions and anticipate future ones.

Some Final Thoughts

This textbook embodies the wise advice that any examination of national security decision-making “must always be grounded in empirical examples; the theory is of little interest unless one can utilize it in specific case studies.”²²²² Stephen Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, “Introduction,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Stephen Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1. It is for this reason that real-world examples and case studies are used throughout to help the reader see concrete applications of theory. In turn,

To be effective, national security analysts and practitioners must understand the decision environment that surrounds senior government officials, as well as the concerns that motivate them, in order to more effectively navigate the process.²⁴²⁴ Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and Mackubin T. Owens, US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: The Evolution of an Incidental Superpower (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 92. A more in-depth examination of “the actors, their motivations, the structures of decision-making and the broader context in which … policy choices are formulated” offers the opportunity to be able “to achieve better outcomes.”²⁵²⁵ Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1–2.

This book aims to give its readers a toolkit to be able to do just that.